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Public choice theory studies collective action in political processes by applying economic
analysis. Thus, most of public choice theory centers around the equilibrium-oriented,
comparative static methodology typical of neo-classical economics, where individuals are
modelled as perfectly rational utility maximizers with no information problems (Mueller,
1976). Although the theoretical advances within the realm of public choice theory over
the past half century are, without doubt, among the most important achievements of the
economic science, some authors have suggested the possibility of extending the comparative
static interpretations to incorporate a more dynamical approach (see e.g. Witt 2003a).
The processes of formation of political ideals and of public opinion, as well as the way in
which actions are carried out in areas such as economic policy, have an essentially dynamic
character (Metcalfe, 1995; Witt, 2003b) that is not well represented in traditional public
choice models. Moreover, some of the authors that have been most inﬂuential in the
development of these theories and models (see e.g. Mueller, 1993, pp. 489-514) consider
that it is desirable to revise some of the postulates of public choice related to the behavior
of the agents (voters, politicians, citizens); concretely, they point out the convenience of
revising the assumption of perfect rationality, allowing more bounded types of rational
behavior (Simon, 1983) and learning processes. The incorporation of such aspects would
allow the models to capture far more realistically certain aspects of policy making and
public opinion formation, such as the ongoing creation and acquisition of new factual and
normative knowledge that takes place during the political process.
This situation oﬀers evolutionary economics a unique opportunity to enrich its partic-
ular research program1 , by accepting the challenge of incorporating certain public choice
1 Excellent surveys of this research program, its frontiers and present challenges are Nelson (1995),
1issues into dynamical evolutionary frameworks. There are at least two reasons why this
should be considered a worthy venture. Firstly, political phenomena share important fea-
tures with other social and economic processes such as technical or institutional change
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1995). Diversity in political options and heteroge-
nous views of voters and citizens, social interactions through local interactive networks,
competitive processes on the part of political parties to capture voters’ attention and
the imperfect understanding of the present and future environmental conditions of policy
makers and policy recipients, are some of the reasons that signal political processes as
being good candidates for analysis from an evolutionary perspective. Secondly, although
the research program of evolutionary economics claims to oﬀer original insights in many
ﬁelds of economics, it is time to address economic policy making from a formal theoreti-
cal perspective since the absence of solid theoretical foundations for policy making is an
important shortcoming of the evolutionary approach (Witt, 2003b).
In this paper we take modest steps towards evolutionary theorizing on economic policy
making by constructing a model in which heterogenous citizens interact and learn at
diﬀerent levels to come up with a precise opinion on a speciﬁcp o l i c yi s s u e :t h eq u e s t i o n
of the most suitable size of the public sector in the economy. Although we will not
propose any voting procedure in the model, nor will we be able to determine the internal
structure of policy making, the analysis of public opinion formation is a ﬁrst step in
approaching political processes from an evolutionary perspective. In fact, at least in
d e m o c r a t i cs o c i e t i e s ,t h ed y n a m i c so fp u b l i co p i n i o na r eo f t e na s s u m e dt ob et h el e g i t i m a t e
source of political power and governmental change.
The analysis of the model proposed here clearly shows that, the recollections of recent
Foster and Metcalfe (2001), and Fagerberg (2003).
2socio-political events in the minds of citizens, the extent to which they trust public in-
stitutions, and their permeability to the political opinions that they get from daily social
interaction, are key factors in explaining the dynamics of the political preferences in a
society. The degree to which political opinions diﬀer over a society’s members is another
element that determines the trajectory followed by public opinion. In order to arrive at
these and other results the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we consider the
characteristics that an evolutionary approach to political dynamics should have. In sec-
tion 3 we propose a model with these characteristics, that allows us to study the concrete
problem of how public opinion on issues of economic policy is formed. Sections 4 and 5
contain the dynamic analysis of the model and the interpretation of the results. Finally
w ee n dw i t ht h ec o n c l u s i o n s .
2 Towards an evolutionary approach to policy issues
An evolutionary approach to policy making should provide new aspects of realism to the
analysis of political process by considering, at least, the following aspects (Witt, 2003b):
1. Bounded rationality on the part of agents (citizens that are aﬀe c t e db yp o l i c ya c t i o n s ,
policy makers, etc.). The cognitive limitations of individuals, and the way in which
they concentrate their attention temporarily on speciﬁc matters while neglecting
others, in general serves to impede their ability to establish complete, stable and
perfectly coherent political preferences (Simon, 1983). Besides, bounded rationality
introduces the need of the agents to attempt to improve their knowledge through
learning, but learning takes time. Thus, this assumption on the behavior of agents
necessarily places us within a dynamical approach to policy issues (Metcalfe, 1995;
Dosi, 2000).
32. Heterogeneity: The agents have heterogeneous and incomplete views of the values,
ends and interests that they ﬁnd desirable.
3. Limited attention and information processing capacity implies selective learning
(agenda setting eﬀects; Witt, 2003b). Thus, in the process of formation of polit-
ical opinions not all issues are treated with the same importance; certain aspects
and measures gain special relevance for individuals at particular moments of time.
4. Selective learning is socially contingent, in the sense that face-to-face communication,
conversation circles and local networks play a key role in setting the agents’ political
agenda and in generating new normative and factual knowledge.
5. Given the socially contingent nature of political learning, we can argue that the pro-
cess of political opinion formation is a collective learning process involving heteroge-
nous agents with ever-changing opinions. Therefore, we can interpret the trajectory
of formation and transformation of public opinion within a society as an emerging
property of this collective learning process.
6. Not only social learning but also trust, habits, fears and disappointments from past
experiences play important roles in the process of public opinion formation (Witt,
2003b).
In the model that follows, we consider these aspects with the objective of analyzing the
process of transformation of public opinion as to the appropriate size of the public sector
in the economy. There exist as many possible diﬀerent political opinions as we want,
and the society is initially distributed over them. We call this distribution the initial
state of public opinion. We assume that citizens can revise their opinions according to
the frequency with which they perceive other opinions that are moderately diﬀerent from
4their own. This process of interaction and interchange inﬂuences the way in which the
diﬀerent opinions are valued within the society. As time goes on, those political opinions
that are most valued socially gain weight. Because we assume bounded rationality, we
do not consider individual processes of rational choice on behalf of the citizens. Instead,
we assume that the population situates itself along the diﬀerent political opinions, and
that the development of this process over time depends on how each possible opinion goes
gaining or losing social favor.
3 Modelling public opinion formation
3.1 The range of political opinions
Assume that there exist n (i =1 ,...,n) diﬀerent political opinions in a society, all related
to a particular issue of public interest. Concretely, we assume that in a society made up
of free and heterogeneous citizens, there are n diﬀerent opinions as to the appropriate size
of the public sector in the economy. We shall assume that the participation of the public
sector in the economy can be approximated by a particular variable: the proportion of total
GDP that is represented by the public administrations’ demand for goods and services2 .
If we denote the public sector’s participation in the economy as deﬁned by opinion i by gi ,
(0 <g i < 1), then we have a vector of possible opinions (g1,...,g n) along which the citizens
may position themselves3 . We can order the components of this vector from greatest to
smallest, so that political opinion “1” favors the least possible presence of the public
sector in the economy, while opinion “n” defends the greatest level of public spending as a
fraction of GDP. For simplicity, and without aﬀecting any results in any signiﬁcant way, we
2 Note that other options are possible, like for example the relative weight of the public deﬁcit in GDP,
ﬁscal pressure, etc.
3 We should not associate directly an opinion gi of the appropriate weight of the public sector in the
economy with other ideological positions related to other issues. Historically we have examples of political
opinions that are profoundly favorable to public intervention and yet that maintain very diﬀerent ideas as
to other issues.
5assume that the diﬀerence between any two neighboring political opinions is a distance a,
(0 <a<1). The value of this parameter determines the degree of diﬀerentiation between
the political opinions. Thus, given g1 we have g2 = g1 + a, g3 = g2 + a = g1 +2 a,e t c .
Generalizing to the case of n diﬀerent opinions, we get:
gi = g1 +( i − 1)a, with i =1 ,...,n and gn < 1 (1)
Since we can, in principle, assume that n i sa sl a r g ea sw ew a n t ,t h ev a r i e t yo fp o l i t i c a l
opinions that exist in the society can also be as wide as we want.
3.2 The evolving structure of public opinion
Let si denote the proportion of all citizens whose political opinion as to the appropriate
w e i g h to ft h ep u b l i cs e c t o ri sgi.T h u s , 0 ≤ si ≤ 1 and
P
i si =1 . The distribution
{si(t)}
n
i=1 synthesizes the positioning of the public opinion concerning our speciﬁc political
issue at instant t. If we are able to establish the social dynamics that determines the
evolution of the distribution {si(t)}
n
i=1, then we will be able to analyze diﬀerent evolutions
of public opinion, as well as the sensitivity of these evolutions to changes in particular social
and economic conditions.
In order to model the evolution of public opinion, we assume (as has been justiﬁed in
Section 2) that the society is made up of boundedly rational citizens. In our model, this
means that given the ongoing social change in public opinion and the cognitive limitations
of individuals, the citizens are not able to deﬁne rational preferences over the range of
diﬀerent political opinions that are present in the society. Consequently, they must undergo
continuous processes of adaptive political learning. In their daily lives, the citizens interact
with other individuals holding diﬀerent political opinions in such a way that, in certain
circumstances, the valuation of a citizen of his own opinion can be inﬂuenced by the
6opinions of others. These processes of social interaction give rise to certain social tendencies
according to which some opinions become more highly valued than others. Likewise, the
way in which the social valuation of the diﬀerent political positions evolves also aﬀects
the citizens, perhaps resulting in some of them changing their own opinion. In order to
formalize these elements, we shall begin with valuation functions of a citizen’s own political
opinion like those suggested in what follows.
3.3 The valuation function
Given the state of public opinion at a particular instant {si(t)}
n
i=1 , we assume that the
citizens that hold opinion i at instant t consider if it is convenient or not to continue to
hold this opinion. In doing so, they begin by valuing their position according to a function
ui(gi) like the following:
ui (gi)=[ α + β(si+1 − si−1)]gi , α,β ∈ (0,1) , i =1 ,...,n (2)
The parameter α ∈ (0,1) captures the basic social valuation of public activities. The
value of α depends on the political memory of the society, on its conﬁdence in the public
institutions, on the mechanisms under which the citizens maintain control over public
organizations (transparency), and on the eﬃciency with which the public sector habitually
carries out its activity. We shall assume that this basic social valuation is a general
characteristic, in the sense that α is common to all citizens. The basic social valuation
allows all citizens to evaluate the expected ﬂow and quality of the public services that are
derived from having dedicated a proportion gi (i =1 ,...,n) of GDP to public activities.
The valuation αgi will be greater the greater is the proportion gi of resources used in public
activities, and the greater is the conﬁdence that this spending is done appropriately (α).
When citizens interact amongst themselves, doubts may arise as to the convenience
7of lending support to a particular level of spending. Under the assumption of bounded
rationality, the individuals do not form a deﬁnitive opinion as to the best level of gi,
but rather they listen to each other, and in certain conditions, they incorporate into
their own valuation the opinions expressed by those others holding political positions that
are moderately diﬀerent from their own. We shall assume that the permeability of the
individuals in a society when revising their political valuation, depending on the opinions
of others, is given by β. Concretely, the way in which we propose to capture the processes
of social interaction within ui (i =1 ,...,n) is: β(si+1 − si−1)gi. This assumption deserves
three comments:
• Local inﬂuence: We assume that the individuals holding opinion i, think about
their position under the inﬂuence, to a greater or lesser extent, of the opinions of
citizens that are politically near-by. Formally, we assume that a citizen who favors
ap r o p o r t i o no fs p e n d i n go fgi determines his own political valuation under the
inﬂuence of the political opinions of those favoring gi+1 and gi−1.
• The predominate proportion of individuals whose opinion is moderately diﬀerent
to that of opinion i will have the eﬀect of forcing the preferences of the holder of
position i in that direction. Thus if si+1 −si−1 > 0 the individuals who favor gi will
revise their basic valuation αgi upward, with an intensity that increases with β.O n
the other hand, if si+1−si−1 < 0 then the individuals who favor gi will be inﬂuenced
with a greater frequency by those favoring a lower level of public spending, and this
can end up being reﬂe c t e di nt h e i ro w no p i n i o n .
• The component β(si+1 − si−1)gi introduces a revaluation or devaluation eﬀect (de-
rived from social interaction) on the basic valuation (αgi). The possibility that one’s
8own opinion is erroneous implies that citizens can evaluate the consequences of com-
mitting errors. Thus, the consequences of errors (that can occur in the hypothetical
scenario of a vote and the consequent application of the policies that are voted4 )
are greater the greater is the level of spending that is defended. If serious doubt
(si+1 − si−1 < 0 ) is cast upon the feasibility of a particular spending program gi,
the costs derived from the infeasibility of such a political proposition are increasing
with gi, and therefore we would see a signiﬁcant downward revision of the political
valuation of this opinion. If, on the other hand, the opinion of individuals who value
gi is reinforced (from local interaction under conditions of si+1 − si−1 > 0)i nt h e
sense that the necessities that would be covered using spending level gi are unavoid-
able, the valuation of political opinion i would be reinforced by more the greater is
the set of public necessities thus identiﬁed, that is, the greater is gi.
Note that in the extreme cases (i =1 ; i = n) the valuation function takes the form
u1 (g1)=αg1 + βs2g1 in the ﬁrst case and un (gn)=αgn − βsn−1gn in the second. Both
political opinions are so extreme that the individuals who hold them can only be inﬂuenced
by citizens who hold more moderate positions.
3.4 Public opinion formation as a social learning process
As a result of the distribution of public opinion at any given moment and of the perme-
ability of the citizens to social interaction, and depending on the value of the basic social
valuation parameter α, the individuals who favor opinion gi (i =1 ,...,n) calculate their
political valuation ui for this option. In what follows, we propose that the process of trans-
formation of public opinion can be modelled as a ﬂow of social interactions between citizens
with diﬀerent opinions and valuations who, because of their bounded rationality, are open
4 We do not consider such a scenario in our model.
9to the possibility of eventually revising their opinion. In as much as social contacts and
interchanges of opinion between citizens with diﬀerent political opinions, it is reasonable
to assume that the more highly valued opinions (those with a greater value of ui (·)) will
be able to attract citizens who are less content with their own opinion. These people can
decide to alter their political position, after having noted that there exist other citizens
with opinions that are diﬀerent from their own, and that appear to be more satisﬁed than
them.
F o r m a l l y ,i fw ed e n o t eb yfij the rate at which citizens with opinion j switch to opinion
i, we assume that this switching rate is given by
fij = γ [ui − uj]+ = γ max(ui − uj;0), γ > 0
So we are assuming that citizens only switch to more highly valued political opinions; if
ui >u j we assume that the only changes of opinion that occur are in the direction j → i.
Assuming that the product δsisj gives the probability for a random and independent
interaction between a citizen with opinion i and another with opinion j,i nas m a l lt i m e
interval ∆t,t h eﬂow of citizens from opinion j to opinion i is given by
δsisjfij∆t






fij − fji = γ [ui − uj]+ − γ [uj − ui]+ = γ (ui − uj)
In this way, the continuous evolution of the proportion of citizens favoring opinion i is




δsisj (fij − fji)=δsi
n X
j=1








or equivalently (taking si(t)=si(δγτ), which only represents a change in velocity)








Therefore, the dynamics of social transformation of public opinion can be represented by
the following replicator dynamics system:
˙ si = si (ui − ¯ u) with ¯ u =
n X
i=1
siui , i =1 ,...,n (3)
The diﬀerence ui−¯ u indicates, at each instant t, whether opinion i (i =1 ,..,n)i sa b o v eo r
below the average. The distances ui −uj, ∀i,j are perceived progressively by the citizens,
leading to changes of opinion of some citizens in favor of opinions that are more highly
valued socially. The ﬂow of citizens changing opinion appears in the endogenous change
in the distribution {si(t)}
n
i=1. Note that the valuation ui = ui (·) made by those citizens
favoring option i, when they must decide whether to change their opinion or not, does not
by itself determine the ﬁnal decision of the citizen.
The social process proposed in (3) simply assumes that there exists a continuous process
of relocation of the population between the diﬀerent political opinions. This process
is such that the opinions that are more highly valued tend to capture new supporters
while the less valued opinions lose support. However the gaining of support is neither
immediate nor total. Due to problems of information and of bounded rationality, and
due to inherent fondness to certain thought habits, process (3) admits the possibility that
even those opinions that are least valued continue to have supporters. Besides, it can be
seen from the assumptions in (2) that the transformation of public opinion changes the
11valuation indexes of each diﬀerent option, which can make this a perpetual process. The
s o c i e t yi st h u sm o d e l l e da sa ne n o r m o u sc o m m u n i c a t i o ns y s t e mi nw h i c hl o c a la n dg l o b a l
connectivity, frequency and the strength of interactions play key roles (Birner, 1999). In
the next section, we shall analyze the type of dynamic trajectory that can be generated
in this model, and we study their ability to explain certain political phenomena.
4A n a l y s i s o f d y n a m i c s
The evolution of the model with n political opinions is determined by the system of
diﬀerential equations:
˙ si = gi(s)=sifi(s)=si[ui − u]=si[αgi + β(As)i − s(αg + βAs)],i=1 ,...,n (4)
where s =( s1,...,s n), g =( g1,...,g n), A is the n × n matrix
A =

                  

0 g1 00··· 0
−g2 0 g2 0 ··· 0





00 ··· −gn−1 0 gn−1
00 ··· 0 −gn 0

                  

(5)




(s1,...,s n) ∈ Rn :
n X
i=1
si =1 ;si ≥ 0,i=1 ,...,n
)
is invariant under (4), and so the phase space of the evolutionary model with n political
opinions is given by an (n−1)-dimensional simplex. The surface of the simplex consists of
n hyperplanes si =0 , each of which gives an invariant set. Therefore, any intersection of
12these hyperplanes is also an invariant set. As a direct consequence we conclude that every
vertex ek =( 0 ,...,0,
k
1,0,...,0) of the simplex Sn is an equilibrium point of system (4).




αg1 + β(As)1 = αg2 + β(As)2 = ...= αgn + β(As)n
s1 + ...+ sn =1
(6)
that satisfy si > 0.




a .I n d e e d ,l e tp be an equilibrium point of (4), i the ﬁrst integer such that
pi 6=0 ,a n dj the last integer such that pj 6=0(1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n). Let us suppose i<j ,
then
αgi + β(Ap)i = αgj + β(Ap)j =⇒ (α + βpi+1)gi =( α − βpj−1)gj =⇒












a ,e v e r yp equilibrium point of (4) must satisfy i = j and therefore p = ek




a equation (4) can have more equilibrium points, both interior to Sn and
on its boundary. However, the same reasoning leads us to prove that, on the one hand, no
equilibrium points exist on the edges eiej for j>i +1(if they exist: αgi+β(Ap)i = αgj +
β(Ap)j, which implies αgi = αgj), and, on the other hand, neither can they exist on the
edges eiei+1 if α
β <
gi
a (αgi+β(Ap)i = αgi+1+β(Ap)i+1 implies αa = β(gi+api) > βgi).
Although the number of equilibrium points of (4) (and, as we will see, their stability)
depends on the values of the parameters g1, a, α and β, its orbits always converge to
bdSn. This can be proved by transforming (4) into the (n − 1)-dimensional system
˙ si = b gi(b s)=gi(b s,s n),i=1 ,...,n− 1 (7)
13with b s =( s1,...,s n−1) and sn =1−
n−1 P
i=1
si,o nt h es i m p l e x
b Sn−1 =
(
(s1,...,s n−1) ∈ Rn−1 :
n−1 X
i=1
si ≤ 1; si ≥ 0,i=1 ,...,n− 1
)
a n dd e t e r m i n i n gt h es i g no ft h ed i v e r g e n c eo ft h ev e c t o rﬁeld b g =( b g1,...,b gn−1) in
int b Sn−1, which is the same as that corresponding to b Db g for any real-valued positive

















after some computations we obtain


























= −D(s) · βsAs = βD(s)
n−1 X
i=1
(gi+1 − gi)sisi+1 > 0
S ot h ed i v e r g e n c eo ff is positive at any point of Sn, that is, the replicator equation (4) is
volume-expanding in intSn. Therefore, every orbit of (4) starting in intSn converges to
bdSn.
In order to analyze the asymptotic behavior5 of the orbits of (4) in a more precise way








(where δij is the Kronecker delta: δij =1 if i = j; δij =0 otherwise). If ek
i =0(i 6= k),
this reduces to fi(ek) for i = j and to 0 for i 6= j,s o fi(ek) is an eigenvalue for
the (left) eigenvector ei. λk,i = fi(ek) is called a transversal eigenvalue at the corner ek
belonging to the eigenvector pointing towards the corner ei. For our system, we obtain
λk,i = αgi + β(Aek)i − αekg − βekAek = αgi + β(Aek)i − αgk
5 See Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) for a comprehensible revision of the mathematical concepts and
methods used in this paper.
14(note that ekAek =0 since the main diagonal of A consists of zeros) which leads to
λk,i = βgk−1 − aα,i = k − 1
λk,i = −βgk+1 + aα,i = k +1 (8)




a ,w eo b t a i nt h a t λk,i < 0 for i<k and λk,i > 0 for i>k .T h e ne1
is a source, en is a sink, and every ek with k =2 ,...,n− 1 is a saddle point, and the
edges of the simplex Sn a r ei s o c l i n e so ft h es y s t e mt h a td e t e r m i n et h es t a b l ea n du n s t a b l e
manifolds of the saddle points. In consequence, every orbit of (4) starting in intSn tends
to en; that is the evolution of public opinion shows a long term concentration towards gn,




a , the orbits of system (4) show a qualitatively very diﬀerent
evolution. In this case, again the unique equilibrium points on the edges of Sn are their
own vertices ek, k =1 ,...,n, and so each edge (not including the corners) is exactly one
orbit of system (4). The transversal eigenvalues at every ek can be represented as an n×n
matrix, where the entry in row k and column i is λk,i = fi(ek) (and it is 0 if si > 0 at
ek); so if element λk,i of this matrix is positive then the orbit ekei evolves from ek to ei,
and from ei to ek when λk,i < 0.F o r α
β <
g1
a the sign structure of the (characteristic)
matrix takes the form

             








... ... ... −
− ··· − +0

             

(9)
15and so we deduce that a heteroclinic cycle appears on bdSn.
Indeed, the edges connecting ek and ek−1 (k =2 ,...,n) are orbits of (4) which evolve
from ek towards ek−1 since the transversal eigenvalues λk,k−1 = βgk−1 − aα are all
positive; and the edge e1en is an orbit evolving from e1 to en since λ1,n = α(gn − g1) is
also positive. So Γn,1 = {en −→ en−1 −→ ... −→ e2 −→ e1 −→ en} is a heteroclinic
cycle of system (4). But it is not the only one: any other sequence Γi,j = {ei −→ ei−1 −→
...−→ ej −→ ei},w i t h i ≥ j +2 , is also a heteroclinic cycle (note that however there is




a , system (4) has a heteroclinic network on bdSn consisting of one
n-cycle, two (n − 1)-cycles, three (n − 2)-cycles, ...,a n d(n − 2) 3-cycles; so the number
of heteroclinic cycles in the network is 1
2(n − 1)(n − 2). The concrete attracting cycle6
depends on the values of the parameters: so, the simulations that were carried out show
that for n =4political options and g1 =0 .1, a =0 .05 (which generates the sequence
g1 =0 .1, g2 =0 .15, g3 =0 .2, g4 =0 .25 of political options), β =1 ,t h ee v o l u t i o no ft h e
orbits tends to the e3e2e1 cycle if α =0 .5,t h ee4e3e2e1 cycle is attracting when α =0 .63,
and the attracting cycle is e4e3e2 for α =1(see Figure 1).
(Figure 1 about here)





a . As we will see, the dynamical behavior
of the orbits of system (4) depends on the relative position of α
β in relation to the values
gi
a .
First of all, note that if α
β >
g2
a then all the transversal eigenvalues λ1,i are positive, and so
6 Stability conditions for cycles in heteroclinic networks are only known in very speciﬁcs i t u a t i o n s( s e e
Brannath, 1994; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
16e1 is a source, which implies that s1 tends to 0 when t −→ ∞. The asymptotic behavior of
the orbits of (4) is then described by the same system (4) but with (the last) n−1 variables






some 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, the evolution of every si with 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 vanishes to 0,a n d
these political options are gradually disappearing from the society. The model is then
(asymptotically) reduced to the (n − m +1 ) -dimensional system (4) concerning to the
variables sm, ..., sn.









a (one value greater), the sign structure of









and, in consequence, we deduce that en and en−1 are sinks (note that this is possible
because a new equilibrium point exists on the edge en−1en). Hence, in this case, we get a
long term concentration on one political option, which depends on the initial conditions.







a (two values greater than α
β): indeed, the (now 3×3) characteristic matrix takes
the form







     

and so en−2 and en are saddle points, and en−1 is a sink (note that a new equilibrium
point exists on the edge en−2en−1) which represents the asymptotic behavior of the orbits
of system (4).
17On the other hand, the case α
β <
gn−2
a (three or more values of
gi
a greater than α
β)




where the diversity of political options is gradually disappearing from the society and a
long term concentration on en−1 or en is produced. This is a consequence of the sign
structure of the characteristic matrix, which for α
β <
gn−2
a is of dimension n − m +1≥ 4
and takes the form

              








              

where C is the matrix given by (9). So we deduce that every ek (m ≤ k ≤ n)i sas a d d l e
point (again note that a new equilibrium point appears on the edge emem+1)a n dt h e r e
exists a heteroclinic cycles network connecting the vertices em+1, ..., en. Then the orbits
of system (4) evolve towards a heteroclinic cycle and now (α
β <
gn−2
a ) the diversity of
political options is permanently present over time.
5D i ﬀerent regimes in the dynamics of public opinion
The dynamic analysis of the model clearly indicates the factors that condition the evolution
of public opinion, given an initial range of diﬀerent options (g1,...,gn), where the diﬀerence
between each option is determined by the political proximity parameter a. The dynamic
model is determined by the value of the ratio α









, and so the fundamental aspect of the interpretation of the
results lies in the interpretation of the parameters α and β.
Recall that the value of α
β depends on the relationship between the basic social valuation
18of the public sector’s activity, and the ease with which citizens adapt to the diﬀerent
political opinions that they note in their immediate neighborhood. Thus, given a value
for β,t h eg r e a t e ri ss o c i a lc o n ﬁdence in the public sector, the transparency of public
institutions and the eﬃciency with which the state carries out its activities in the economy,
the greater will be the social valuation of the public sector, and the greater will be the ratio
α
β. As a consequence, elements such as corruption and its eﬀects on the political memory
of a society, the accumulation of public ineﬃciencies that tend to erode the conﬁdence
of citizens, or the deterioration of the mechanisms of civil control over public institutions
will have a negative eﬀect on the parameter α, thereby reducing the ratio α
β. On the other
hand, however, the actions of powerful social agents like, for example, the mass-media,
can also aﬀect (in either direction) the value of this ratio. In that way, propaganda in
favor of the government, or to the contrary, criticisms of the public administration in the
media, can also inﬂuence the value of α
β (reducing or increasing it, respectively), thereby
conditioning the evolution of public opinion.
Following on from the analysis in Section 4 of the exact way in which α
β conditions the
dynamics of the model, we can establish certain conclusions on the inﬂuence of the social
aspects concerning the evolution of public opinion that have just been mentioned. Firstly,
it was shown in Section 4 that for values of α
β >
gn−2
a and consequentially, for changes in
the aforementioned social conditions that can increase the value of the ratio to such levels,
we observe a long run concentration of public opinion on one of the options that assigns
maximum weight to the state within the economy, gn or gn−1. This particular evolution
of public opinion is characterized by a progressive erosion in the diversity of opinions, and
has its origin in a very high social valuation of the public sector (or in a very low intensity
of local interaction between citizens).




that is, if the basic social valuation is low, or if it deteriorates signiﬁcantly compared to the
intensity of the social interactions of the citizens, the evolution of public opinion becomes
more complex. Note that it is precisely this type of situation that we can expect to see
after certain periods of corruption or when public ineﬃciency introduces doubts into the
minds of citizens. Such an evolution regime for public opinion is characterized by the
appearance of a heteroclinic network with the following features:
1. In this evolution regime we ﬁnd that several political opinions persist indeﬁnitely;
that is, we do not get a progressive concentration of the population on a single




2 .A sc a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e1 ,t h ew a yi nw h i c ht h es y s t e mt e n d st obdSn, reveals the
fact that, in spite of a general persistence of many opinions, during most of the time
two particular opinions predominate over the others (most of the time the orbits are
close to the edges of Sn). This property can perhaps explain, within a framework
in which political parties incorporate dominant opinions into their electorial cam-
paigns, why we often get two dominant parties. Given the frequency with which
such a situation can be found in real-world democracies, we note that our model
makes realistic predictions, at least as far as this result is concerned, under certain
conditions.
3. The change in the attracting heteroclinic cycle resulting from changes in the values
of the parameters (bifucation phenomenon) indicates that small shocks that aﬀect
the parameter values slightly can have important eﬀects. We can think of the con-
sequences for public opinion of the denouncement in the mass-media of a case of
20corruption. If this news aﬀects the parameters and gives rise to a change in the
attracting cycle, we could observe the reappearance of certain political opinions that
are not highly valued socially, or even the disappearance of traditionally important
options.





a for some 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1,
the evolution of every si with 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1 vanishes to 0, and these political options
gradually disappear from the society. This result allows us to understand how, in
some situations, we can get processes of successive and ordered disappearance of
certain political opinions, precisely those that society considers to be too extreme.
Finally, note that the parameter of political proximity between the diﬀerent opinions,
a, also plays a central role in the evolutions that have just been interpreted: when opinions
are closer together (and so we have a greater number of opinions) then we get a greater
region of persistence of diversity.
Now that we have analyzed the relationships between the basic social valuation of the
public sector (and its determinants), the process of social interaction between citizens, and
the concrete evolution of public opinion in a society, we now turn to suggestions of how
our model may be extended to cater for the evolutionary analysis of political processes.
Without going into too much detail, and since in our model we have limited the opinions
of the citizens to the concrete case of the appropriate weight of the public sector in the
economy, one particular extension would consist in the study of the way in which diﬀerent
trajectories of public opinion can materialize themselves in the actual trajectories of public
spending. Thus, assuming adaptive behavior (vote searching) by certain political parties
competing in a democratic election, we could consider the question of to whether the
average public opinion trajectory g(t)=
P
i si (t)gi, is a relevant indicator of the actual
21e v o l u t i o no ft h ew e i g h to ft h ep u b l i cs e c t o r .
A second extension to the model could consist of proposing voting rules that allow the
general population to democratically elect from among a set of political parties. These
parties would include in their electorial campaigns proposals that reﬂect some of the
political opinions present in the society, and they can adapt these proposals over time
according to the evolution of public opinion. In any case, such an extension would imply
the need to deﬁne a menu of issues (not only the relative size of the public sector) about
which the citizens may form opinions.
6 Summary
In this paper we have considered the possibility that public opinion undergoes a transfor-
mation as a result of evolutionary processes of social change. Local interactions between
boundedly rational citizens, who perceive and adapt to certain social tendencies when
they formulate their own political opinions, generate emergent dynamic properties of pub-
lic opinion that can be quite diﬀerent. We have seen how, within this type of process, the
basic social valuation of public institutions can be a determinant factor for social change.
If our strategy is a valid manner in which to study the dynamics of certain political
processes, the next step would be to introduce voting rules under which diﬀerent political
options can be incorporated into democratic election campaigns. To do this, we would
need to provide an adequate foundation for the behavior of political parties and policy-
makers within a bounded rationality framework. The comparison of the results obtained
in such a framework with those already available from Public Choice theory would be
of great interest. Such a comparative study would allow us to check if the dynamics of
political processes, with boundedly rational agents, implies a step forward in realism or
not, in comparison with the rational-static frameworks of Public Choice. However, the
22complexity of such extensions and the current state of the art in this area of research force
us to leave such thoughts on the future research agenda.
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Figure 1: Attracting heteroclinic cycles for n =4
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